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Ownership, Financial Strategy and Performance: The Lancashire Cotton Textile 
Industry, 1918-1938 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article assesses the validity of John Maynard Keynes’ claim that the Lancashire 
cotton industry failed to restructure because the banks as debt holders prevented firms 
exiting the industry, creating persistent over-capacity. Using case studies from a 
substantial sample of Lancashire firms, the paper explores archival evidence to 
establish their financial characteristics,  to examine their equity and debt finance and 
the governance roles of directors and outside ownerhip groups. On the basis of this 
review the paper develops hypotheses to suggest alternatives to the view that bank debt 
was the dominant explantion of firm level behaviour and industry failure. Applying 
these to a statsitical dataset,  results show that syndicates of local shareholders, not 
banks, were an important impediment to the exit of firms. Moreover, syndicates milked 
firms of any profits through dividends, thereby limiting reinvestment and re-equipment 
possibilities. Our results show that where laissez-faire fails in response to a crisis, 
incumbent investors, particularly block-holders, can be an important impediment to 
corporate restructuring.  
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1. Introduction 
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There has been a substantial debate about the benefits rationalisation might have 
conferred on British manufacturing during the interwar. period2  One industry which 
has featured prominently is the Lancashire cotton-textile industry.  In the End of 
Laissez-Faire, writing against the backdrop of the inter-war economic crisis, Keynes 
argued that the role of the government is not to try to do what is being done better, but to 
do what is not being done.3 For Keynes, there was no better illustration of this point 
than the Lancashire cotton textile industry. As demand in overseas export markets 
collapsed, creating a serious problem of over-capacity, the industry’s large number of 
relatively small firms competed intensely on the basis of marginal cost pricing. For 
Keynes the solution was the reorganisation of the industry. An important obstacle was 
the intractability of the incumbent management and financial stakeholders. The banks 
might have promoted reorganisation, but were ‘professional paralytics’, and it was 
‘against their tradition to do anything whatsoever in any conceivable circumstances’. 
He also called for the dismissal of the vast majority of cotton Company directors, 
However, Keynes was careful in his choice of scapegoats. In particular he sought to 
avoid implicating those responsible for the re-financing of the industry already carried 
out in the boom of 1919-20. Contemporary commentators who stressed the problems 
resulting from these events, were criticised by Keynes for finding easy solace and 
standing in the way of educating opinion as to what he saw as the correct diagnosis 
(Keynes, 1928, p.199).4 
In presenting  new evidence to test the propositions that follow from Keynes’s 
arguments, the article addresses the key aims and objectives of this special issue which 
are to examine the ‘methodological issues, particularly the role and opportunities for 
empirical research in business history’; to ‘explicitly address the development of theory 
and/or hypothesis testing’; as well as building ‘generalisations [that help us to] 
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understand and explain causal mechanisms’, and, perhaps most importantly, we, 
‘develop scientific knowledge by constructing theories which are subject to empirical 
testing [which] will develop knowledge about businesses and entrepreneurs in their 
historical context and about their interactions with the environment’5(emphasis added). 
 To achieve these objectives, the paper uses archival evidence to demonstrate 
that investor syndicates, both internal and external to this industry, exerted powerful 
effects on the ability of heavily recapitalised firms to pursue exit strategies. These links 
between finance, ownership and strategic behaviour provide an opportunity to develop 
and test hypotheses concerning the relative impact of investment by different groups of 
financial stakeholders on firm strategy. They suggest that strategy, financial 
performance and long term survival will be determined by the governance 
characteristics of the firm. The hypotheses generate evidence useful in wider literatures 
by illustrating the role of ownership as a potential constraint on corporate restructuring 
and as a determinant of managerial performance.6 For the cotton industry these results 
also indicate that Keynes was far too dismissive of refinancing and the problems it 
caused; that investor groups in particular were at least as important, if not more so, than 
the banks that initially provided recapitalisation funds and subsequently kept indebted 
firms in the industry. The results are important because they show that the Keynesian 
panacea of reorganisation was insufficient and that financial restructuring, especially 
the radical variation of ownership rights, was also required.  
Our analysis is also relevant for research on corporate restructuring and 
business turnaround within strategic management field since it uncovers a complex 
interplay of governance conflicts associated with a combination of debt and equity 
financing. As a consequence, the paper also contributes to more recent studies that 
question the universality of governance-strategy-performance relationship associated 
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with agency-grounded research and suggest that the impact of governance factors may 
also depend on organizational contingencies, such the stage in the firm’s life-cycle, 
industry environment etc.7 More specifically, we revisit the proposition that, in the 
context of organizational decline, governance factors, such as board directors’ 
interlocks or presence of concentrated institutional ownership in situation of limited 
stock market liquidity, may impose severe constraints on possible turnaround 
strategies.8 Our archival evidence helps to develop this theoretical framework further 
by combining firm-level data with more qualitative evidence obtained from the 
contemporary sources on individual cases and industry dynamics in general. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we compare and contrast the key 
features of Keynes’s analysis of the industry’s problems with those of other informed 
contemporaries. Particular emphasis is placed on the observation that, unlike his 
contemporaries, Keynes was generally dismissive of the impact of re-flotation.  In 
Section 3 the composition of investor syndicates is analysed. Notwithstanding 
contemporary and subsequent debates, there is no prior empirical evidence concerning 
the composition of these groups. Indeed there are only passing references to ‘London’ 
and ‘Metropolitan’ syndicates and our research shows that these references are partially 
and materially inaccurate. Section 4 examines the role of investor groups, both 
syndicates and banks, and their impact on firm level performance outcomes, using a 
financial data set and appropriate econometric models. The comparative impact of bank 
lending and financial syndicate investment is assessed. Discussion and conclusions are 
presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Keynesian and other interpretations of the collapse  
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The fundamental feature of the Lancashire textile industry between the wars was the 
violent and, as it turned out, irreversible contraction in world demand for cotton goods. 
The broad facts of this collapse have been extensively documented. The salient points 
are that during the 1920s, and 1930s, exports of cotton piece goods were 58% and 29 % 
respectively of their 1913 level.  For yarn exports, the relevant figures were 80% and 
66% respectively.9 Of particular importance in this collapse were the loss of the Indian 
market and Japanese competition in third markets.  In 1913, out of a total British 
production of approximately 700 million yards of cotton piece goods, 43 % by quantity 
and 36% by value, were exported to India.10 By the 1930s, Indian production of cotton 
piece goods and yarn was 34% and 131% greater, respectively, than its pre-war average. 
A number of factors, including the disruption caused by the war, reduced shipping 
facilities, growing nationalism and increasing tariff protection, account for India’s 
reduced dependence on Lancashire exports. The reversal in the Indian market was 
exacerbated by Japanese competition. Between 1914 and 1930, Japan’s share of Indian 
imports of cotton piece goods increased over a hundred-fold, and Bowker estimated 
that Japanese penetration of the Chinese market was responsible for 17.6% of the 
decline in Lancashire’s exports.11   
However, although these basic facts were well known to contemporaries, there 
was less agreement on what the industry should have done in order to restore its 
competitiveness. For convenience, we contrast two interpretations: one is Keynes’ view 
that reorganisation was required but the banks and industry directors prevented this 
outcome. The second is that advanced by other contemporaries that world economic 
conditions were to blame and recapitalization simply made matters worse.12 
 
The Keynesian historiography 
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Keynes’ analysis of the problems affecting the industry focused on excess capacity and, 
its consequence, short-time working. ‘The termination of the short-time policy is 
urgently called for, and the substitution for it of a ‘rationalising process’ designed to cut 
down overhead costs by the amalgamation, grouping or elimination of mills’. 
Short-time working increased the costs of the industry, aggravated financial losses, and 
led to financial exhaustion. Keynes was adamant that while a policy of short-time 
working might be desirable to meet temporary disturbances in trade, it was absolutely 
disastrous as a long-term solution.  In any case, as he pointed out, the actual practice of 
short-time working was very badly organised. 13   
The solutions to short-time working proposed by Keynes were threefold: the 
elimination of weak-sellers (those selling output below cost), the adjustment of surplus 
capacity and rationalisation to achieve appropriate economies.14 Why, then, was the 
required contraction in capacity not forthcoming?  Keynes position on this was clear: 
the banks had lent so much to the industry, particularly its financially weaker 
companies, that they were loath to let their debtor companies go bankrupt, even though 
this would have accelerated the adjustment of capacity in the industry.15 In Keynes’ 
perspective, the banks could have promoted change in the industry,16 but chose not too 
(authors’ emphasis). Whilst castigating the banks, Keynes dismissed the significance of 
the re-capitalisation boom: 
 
‘The industry is riddled with unsound finance; some of it the result of the 
over-capitalisation of the boom period….If high capitalisation and bad 
management were the essential troubles, reconstructions and bankruptcies 
might be the right solution. But they are only secondary troubles. The real 
 7 
trouble – and this is the beginning, the middle and the end of my argument – is 
surplus capacity.’17 
Keynes argued that the recapitalisations of the 1919-20 boom were irrelevant as they 
did not affect earnings, suggesting that even if this capital were written off the problem 
would persist without solving the underlying problem of over-capacity.18  Therefore, as 
far as Keynes was concerned, the writing-off of capital was trivial and the important 
challenge was reorganisation.  
In this respect, Keynes was not unique. Turning to the general problem of 
excess capacity, there was recognition that rationalisation and re-organisation could 
improve the competitive position of industry, but the existence of a large fringe of small 
producers hampered the efforts of big firms trying to secure these efficiencies.19 John 
Ryan, (Managing Director of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation (LCC)), argued that 
amalgamation and re-organisation would simultaneously help Lancashire to improve 
her international competitiveness and provide relief to the spinning section which was a 
labouring under heavy financial losses.20  In the specific case of the Lancashire cotton 
textile industry, the subsequent historiography strongly endorses the Keynesian 
interpretation, and most acknowledge that over-capacity was a root cause of the post 
war problems.21  
Opinions differ somewhat as to who should have taken responsibility. Bamberg 
adds to Keynes’ famous accusation that the bankers acted as 'a species of deaf mutes', 
abandoning their responsibilities, showing the competitive structure of bank lending to 
have been inimical to industry recovery. Indeed, as Bamberg has noted, the 
indebtedness of the industry could have provided the means for its salvation.22 However, 
this had to await the formation of the LCC in 1929.  Frank Platt, managing director of 
the LCC, realised that many firms in the American section were heavily indebted to the 
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banks that might be able to coerce their heavily indebted mill customers to obey price 
maintenance schemes.  The banks had an obvious reason for exercising this coercion: 
their own fortunes had become intricately and heavily tied up in the fortunes of the 
spinning industry.  For example, the index of bank overdrafts for a sample of 145 
refloated companies  increased from 100 in January 1921 to 152 by January 1924.23  
The extent to which individual banks were exposed varied substantially: the Midland 
Bank’s customers accounted for 34.7 per cent of American spindles, but its total 
commitment was lower than William Deacon’s which accounted for 13.8 per cent of 
American spindles and whose total advances to 40 spinning companies was £3.7m by 
the end of 1928.24   Consequently, the banks had little option but to increase their 
overdrafts in order to try and protect previous loans to these firms.  Periods of 
‘weak-selling’, by increasing the operating losses of these firms, increased further the 
demand for overdraft facilities from the banks.  Thus, in 1933, for example, Platt 
launched a price maintenance scheme to cover the medium ‘American’ section, which 
enlisted the support of a number of banks, all of which agreed to use their influence to 
force debtor spinning companies to observe minimum prices. However, even this 
option seems to have operated with only very limited success and was a ‘dead letter’ by 
1934.25 
Bamberg’s evidence indicates that the most effective means for securing 
adherence to price maintenance schemes was completely independent of the banks and 
rested, instead, on the ability of the LCC to instigate a form of price leadership.  Instead 
of following prices down in successive stages, as more firms abandoned existing price 
agreements, Platt proposed in 1934 that the LCC should undercut all its competitors by 
going directly to the ‘rock-bottom’ price.26  This option was more than just an idle threat: 
the LCC had accumulated substantial reserves to protect itself against the breakdown of 
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‘gentlemen’s agreements’.  Such was the success of this scheme that not only did it 
provide the basis for new and effective price maintenance schemes in the ‘American’ 
section  for the rest of the 1930s but, also, in the ‘Egyptian’ section. 27 Obstinate 
directors, whom Keynes suggested should be dismissed have been subsequently 
criticised for their ‘individualistic attitudes’, 28  as have the unions for lack of 
co-operation.29 
 
Contemporary opinion 
For a second interpretation we need to consider contemporary opinion, since this view 
has attracted little support subsequently. Whiggish attitudes and hindsight make it 
difficult for historians to do other than condemn this view, since it is well known that 
the hoped for return to pre-1914 conditions never materialised. Indeed contemporary 
opinion was far from a consensus, and such optimism attracted some ridicule. 30 
However, unlike Keynes, many informed contemporary observers did place much 
greater emphasis upon the harmful effects of the recapitalisation boom.  Daniels and 
Jewkes and the report by Political and Economic Planning argued that those firms that 
had recapitalised had stronger inducements to engage in price-cutting in order to secure 
the volumes required to cover their inflated costs.31 Both of these authorities also 
suggested that the effects of recapitalisation worked against any effective joint action 
either regarding output restriction to raise prices, or to secure amalgamation.32 Henry 
Clay, a special adviser to the Bank of England, supported these views. He also argued 
that the supply of loan capital, which should have been available to finance 
re-equipment and facilitate re-organisation, had been drained away by the need of 
re-capitalised companies to call-up unpaid share capital in order to meet interest 
charges and to replace withdrawn loans.33   
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In addition, contemporary observers were well aware of the disastrous effects 
that external syndicates could have on the fortunes of individual mills. James White 
established the London-based Beecham Trust34 which was intimately involved in the 
flotation and re-flotation of famous British manufacturing companies such as Austin 
Motor Co., and the Dunlop Rubber Co.35  In the Lancashire cotton industry, White, via 
the Beecham Trust, participated in the flotation of the Amalgamated Cotton Mills Trust 
(ACMT) in  1919.36   
This year marked the start of the recapitalisation boom when the fortunes of the 
Lancashire textile industry appeared unlimited.  During the first annual general meeting 
of ACMT – also in 1919 – the chairman of ACMT, Lord Fairfax, proudly proclaimed 
that: 
‘It would appear to me that certain gentlemen in Lancashire, who 
take an interest in the trade of that county, are agitated by the fear 
that the great cotton spinning and manufacturing trade may be in 
danger of becoming controlled by London financiers.  I should like 
to recall to your memory that, so far as the Amalgamated Cotton 
Mills Trust (Limited) is concerned, our mills are in no sense of the 
word controlled by London financiers’37 
 
At the same, an extraordinary general meeting (AGM ) was held at which the 
directors of ACMT were persuaded to create 1,300,000 new Ordinary shares of £1 
which the Beecham Trust agreed to take at £3 a share, less a commission of £10,000.  
Subsequently, in 1920, the share capital was more than trebled.   The consequences of 
this substantial – and unwarranted – increase in capital were clear for all to see: ACMT 
failed to pay a dividend on its ordinary shares from 1919/21 until 1937/38, when its 
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capital structure was re-arranged.38  In addition, by 1930, the company’s ordinary 
shares (nominal value £1), including those that the Beecham Trust agreed to purchase 
for £3, were quoted in the range 2s, 7.5d to 7.5d.39 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the view 
of one commentator on White has been damning: ‘the fact that he helped to saddle 
Lancashire with a disastrous load of “watered” capital probably figured for as little in 
his calculations as the ruin caused to thousands of small investors who followed his 
star.’ 40  White was a controversial figure, condemned by contemporaries for 
manipulating the share prices of companies that he floated.41 Ernest Terah Hooley had a 
similar track record and attracted criticism for similar reasons. In 1920, Hooley 
promoted the Jubilee Cotton Mill in Oldham for the purposes of defrauding a wealthy 
Cardiff-based investor and was convicted for fraud.42 On his release, Hooley wrote: 
‘Several people, with no more pretentions to honesty than myself, made millions of 
pounds, selling mill shares that were not worth a shilling apiece…If everybody had 
their just deserts there would have been a hundred other men put in prison.’43 
 Similarly, Sir Edward Mackay Edgar, who was a partner in the finance house, 
Sperling & Co., promoted the substantial amalgamation, Crosses & Winkworth 
Consolidated Mills (C&WCM) and Crosses & Heatons’ Associated Mills Ltd., in 1920 
and 1921, respectively.44 Edgar was, significantly, chairman of both these companies 
during the early 1920s.45  An important feature of the formation of the C&WCM was 
the sale of 11 million shares to the directors by Sperling at a substantial discount to the 
issue and subsequent market price. 20 million ordinary shares of 1s were issued, of 
which 11 million were purchased by Sperling & Co., and resold to the directors 'and 
their friends' at par. Unlike the directors, the investing public were required to purchase 
in units of 1 £1 preference shares and 3 ordinary shares for 33s. The preference shares 
were issued at a premium of 10s, so that the ordinary shares were notionally issued at 
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par.46 Although the preference shares participated in a further 20% of profits after their 
fixed dividend,47 a 50% premium, applied to the preference shares only, made little 
sense. Unsurprisingly, shortly after the issue the ordinary shares were trading at around 
1s 11d (a 92% premium) whilst the preference shares traded at around 18s (a 40% 
discount).48 The premium on the ordinary shares and the discount on the preference 
shares represented a risk free wealth transfer of just over £500,000 from the investing 
public to the directors.  
 Again, the subsequent financial performance of these companies was dire.  
C&WCM had to drastically restructure its capital in 1928, involving the writing-down 
of 3 million £1 cumulative preference shares to 6 shillings each, and the 20 million £1 
ordinary shares to 2 million shares.  The companies were bought for a total purchase 
price of £5 million, but for the purposes of this reconstruction, the company’s land, 
building and machinery, were valued at just £1.2 million in 1928.49  C&WCM paid a 
dividend on its ordinary shares in 1921, but no further dividends on this class for the 
rest of the inter-war period.  Crosses & Heatons’ appear never to have paid a dividend 
on ordinary shares.50  
 The evidence suggests therefore that recapitalisation impacted upon 
subsequent financial performance, which may explain why contemporary opinion 
referred to above concentrated on the relationships between re-capitalisation, 
over-capacity, individual firm behaviour, and weak-selling. The case also illustrates 
some important analytical relationships between principal and agent expectations and 
asset values.51 However, the comparative influence of the banks and the syndicates on 
firm strategy, including the exit decision, has not been analysed. Indeed, until now, 
Keynes’ views on earnings, re-capitalisation and capital write-offs have not been 
questioned much in the subsequent literature.52 None have presented significant new 
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empirical evidence. Even so, an empirical analysis of the composition of the syndicates 
and their relative impact on individual firm behaviour compared to the banks is 
important. This is in line with more recent research on the limitations of “pecking 
order” hypothesis in corporate finance that suggests that net equity issues track the 
financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. Therefore, financial problems in 
a firm should be simultaneously attributed to the leverage and equity issues.53  If the 
banks had an interest in preventing their clients exiting in order to avoid the consequent 
capital write-offs, then so too did the financial syndicates. Arguably the syndicates had 
more reason and greater ability to force firms to stay in the industry. Banks had the 
relative benefit of secured lending, albeit on reduced asset values and even where 
minimal, stood to obtain any marginal benefit ahead of the unsecured equity syndicates. 
Where loan interest payments were deferred, they were allowed to accumulate so there 
was an expectation of higher payments in future years. Equity holders benefited only 
where the firm had sufficient earnings to depreciate the overvalued assets and meet 
fixed interest charges. 54 Unlike the banks, the syndicates had direct control over the 
board and the strategy of the firm through the control of voting shares. Corporate 
governance researchers have pointed out these potential differences between modes of 
financing and the associated control factors.55 Although Keynes called for the dismissal 
of the company directors, adding they were unlikely to vote for their own dismissal,56 it 
has not been empirically established that this was a realistic option. If outside 
syndicates were significant, such resolutions could only be carried with their support. 
Although it was well known that cotton directors had shareholdings, the scale of these 
and also the extent to which interlocks might have influenced directors to behave 
collectively have not been established empirically. 57 More specifically, it is not clear 
how controlling power associated with directors’ interlocks and shareholdings was  
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translated into majority voices  at annual general meetings in companies they 
controlled.  
Specifically the role of cross directorships and shareholdings has not been 
examined for the crucial 1919-20 re-capitalisation boom. Unlike previous cotton 
booms, such as 1907 and 1911-13, the events of 1919-21, were without precedent, 
particularly with regard to the severity and duration of the ensuing depression. 58 
Consequently, the presence of such network connections might impact on coalescence 
in the strategies advocated by the syndicates and any outside investor groups. Although 
convenient for the first interpretation of decline discussed above, the neglect of the role 
of the syndicates is therefore surprising, and the analysis below examines their effects, 
in contrast to the banks, more closely.  
There is a further and potentially important consequence of the presence of 
these outside investors. Keynes and contemporaries59 seem to agree that they had little 
technical understanding or other useful knowledge of the industry other than perhaps its 
propensity to pay very generous dividends during periodic booms. In addition to the 
question of whether the syndicates forced firms to stay in the industry, there is the 
further question of their impact on business and financial strategy. Specifically it is 
likely that they would have forced the cotton companies to repay any profits as 
dividends, so that the capacity for recovery through new investment could not be 
sustained. More recent strategic management research indicates that different types of 
institutional investors may have different decision-making horizons and preferences 
with regard to business strategies their portfolio firms may pursue.60   As a result, it is 
possible that the specific make-up of investor syndicates in the industry has created a 
specific set of constraints imposed on managerial decision-making and the firms’ 
strategic orientation.  
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3.  The syndicates: scale,  characteristics and effects on firm behaviour 
To examine the effects of ownership on managerial behaviour there are two empirical 
tasks. The first is to establish the nature of the ownership groups involved in the 
re-capitalisation boom of 1919-1920. Although an empirical contribution to the 
historical literature in its own right, this also provides a platform for second empirical 
task which is the development of statistically testable hypotheses. Knowing the detailed 
composition of ownership groups allows the statistical results to be triangulated and 
judgements to be made about the suitability of the proxies used. These two tasks are 
dealt with in turn below.  
 
Ownership and control characteristics 
To examine ownership and control characteristics of the re-capitalised companies all 
available annual returns from the BT31 file at the Public Record Office (PRO) were 
examined. The PRO has a policy of retaining a random sample of 1 in 5 company 
records and it was therefore appropriate to examine all surviving documents for firms 
that were known to be in existence, and to have been re-capitalised (as detailed in 
Worrall’s and Tattersall’s trade directories). The process produced a sample of 41 
individual company archives. Within each, share registers, articles of association and 
annual returns (form E) were examined to identify the directors and significant 
shareholders in the re-capitalised companies, the scale of their cross-shareholdings, and 
the buy-sell and buy-hold behaviour of investing individuals and groups.  
Table 1 shows the ownership details for the 41 firms. For each firm the table 
shows the paid up capital, the proportion of that capital owned by the directors, the 
proportion owned by significant (defined as 5%>) blocks of outside investors, and the 
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level and type of debt finance. Boards did not vary a great deal in size, typically 
consisting of five or six directors, so data is not reported in table 1 and the strength of 
insider control is measured using directors’ share-ownership. The average total holding 
by directors’ using the figures in table 1 was 26.2%. As the table shows, for 5 out of the 
41 firms, the directors had outright control with combined holdings of greater than 
50%.61In view of the size of these blockholdings and the pattern of ownership in 
residual shares, de facto control was likely even higher. Examples of inside blocks 
include Alexander Young and William Henry Heywood,  two of the directors in 
Brunswick Mill, who jointly owned 31% on initial allottment; in Argyll, the directors 
owned  15.3%; Avon, 27.3%;  Belgrave, 38.6%;  Century Mill, 66.5%; Clover Mill, 
35.7%,  Delta,  28.3% and in Fern, the directors owned 22.8%.62  
Most firms (29 out of 37  in Table 1 for which data was available) used debt 
finance of some description. Where debt was used, it represented 47% of the total 
(c.£4.25m debt compared to c.£4.72m equity for the 37 companies that had data on 
debt). As the equity of the firms was revalued for the purposes of the refloation, this 
represents a good estimate of the the average leverage of the firms at the height of the 
boom. As the cases in Table 1 illustrate, loan finance predominated over structured 
debt (preference shares and debentures) and bank overdrafts. Indeed firms using bank 
finance represented a small minority of cases. Debt finance, as Keynes and others 
suggested, was important, but not specifically bank finance, reinforcing the view that 
the banks, when forced to intervene, were relatively new financial participants in the 
affairs of the industry when the crisis struck. Debt finance also varied considerably 
from firm to firm and may therefore have moderated different strategic responses at 
firm level during the crisis. This issue is returned to in the next section of the paper. 
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Outside equity ownership meanwhile rarely amounted to significant influence. 
Only 13 out of the 41 companies in Table 1 had examples of significant outside 
ownership. For example,  Francis Trippet, one of the directors of the Bolton Union 
Spinning Co., was also a director of City General Trust Ltd.63 These connections may 
explain why Bolton Union represented a rare case of London-based investment, with 
significant investments from the Lancashire Cotton Syndicate, Barclays Bank and 
Horatio Bottomley, the MP and financial manipulator.64  Indeed, outside of our sample, 
the only other Bolton spinning company for which we can establish significant outside 
ownership, was Beehive which attracted a London investment group. 65  
Manchester-based William P. Hartley who had made money in preserves, invested in a 
portfolio of companies with investments in Asia, Duchess, Textile and Times. 
‘Gentlemen’ investors were often based in Manchester, Liverpool and the Fylde coastal 
towns, but rarely in London or other non-Lancahsire metropolitan locations. Examples 
include William Sidebottom (Elder), James Chadwick (Fern), William Hartley Higham 
(Textile) and John Kenyon (Asia), 66  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Even then these outside investors were insignificant compared to the degree of 
inside control prevalent in the crisis-ridden Oldham section. Table 2 shows the number 
of directorships held by individuals identified from the returns of the 41 companies 
examined. This process identified seventeen individuals holding directorships in just 
under half of the 41 companies examined, but also including directorships in 
companies outside the sample and in a small minority of cases outside the cotton 
industry. Between them these seventeen individuals were on the boards of 66 
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companies, mainly other cotton mills. Most of these individuals were also involved in 
the promotion of their companies in the recapitalisation booms and held some stock for 
resale post refloation. Promoter and share dealer Samuel Firth Mellor was a director of 
18 companies.67 Harry Tweedale, a stockbroker for William Deacons Bank, was a 
director of Dale Mill and a founding director of Arrow Spinning Co and Century 
Spinning Co (in which he owned, or represented, 15.4% of the initial allotment of the 
stock). The pattern of inter-locks reinforces the evidence of the influence of these 
promotional groups of insiders in the recapitalisation boom and the sunk nature of their 
investments. Their undiversified and risky position would be more likely to commit 
them to the industry, reducing the likelihood of exit. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
These commitments led them, like Keynes, to call for the reconstruction of the 
industry. John S. Hammersley, who was also a director of several companies,  
advocated the financial restructuring of the industry, involving the variation of 
claim-holders’ rights.68 Unlike Keynes therefore he focused on ownership rather than 
the bank loans, capacity and short-selling problems. His scheme was based on cash for 
equity, which as the argument below suggests was indeed necessary to rescue the 
industry. Compared to Keynes’s argument, it is easy to see why it was unpersuasive. 
His scheme not only compensated the speculators for their failure, but it also 
presupposed there were new investors whose expectations about the industry’s future 
were more optimistic than incumbent investors.69 
Inside directors were in any case significant and typically long-term investors. 
For example, in the case of Anchor (1920), and Asia (1920), the original directors of 
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these companies held the same, or increased ownership shares, in 1934 and 1926, 
respectively.70  Examination of Statements in Lieu of Prospectus indicates that the 
monies paid to directors who promoted their company could be substantial, and 
therefore they had no pressing incentive to sell further shares post issue. For example, 
Cecil Hilton and John Stuttard, who promoted Earl Mill and subsequently acted as 
directors, received £5000 each for their work as promoters.71 Some outside investors 
exited completely and early.  For example, Hartley, the preserve manufacturer referred 
to earlier, sold his entire holding of 28,000 shares in Asia Mill, on 21 July, 1921, 
thirteen months after purchase.72  Insiders made only partial disposals if at all, and such 
transactions usually involved stockbrokers such as Firth Mellor and Bunting. It is likely 
that the stockbrokers who were also directors simultaneously provided market liquidity 
in their own companies for potential buyers.73  It is very difficult to believe that these 
stockbrokers were able to increase total liquidity for cotton shares though there is some 
evidence that stockbrokers who were not directors, were able to effect substantial 
liquidation of their holdings:  for example, in 1928, Samuel Firth Mellor sold his entire 
holding of 38,700 shares (£24,187), in Gorse Mill to the Union Bank. 74  The 
fundamental feature of the Oldham Stock Exchange was its dependence on cotton 
shares: ‘Cotton spinning companies continued to be the unique feature of the Oldham 
Stock Exchange throughout its time as an independent exchange’.75  No other exchange 
quoted Oldham mill shares. The Manchester and London stock exchanges had 
substantially more liquidity, but the low volume of business and the increased risk 
because of poorer market intelligence, made mill shares very unattractive.  In any case, 
major stockbrokers at the Oldham exchange held multiple mill directorships, for 
example, James Henry Bunting and Kenneth Morris76, meaning that the fate of this 
exchange was inextricably linked to the fate of the industry.  Consequently, the total 
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number of shareholders was usually quite small and there were surprisingly few 
transactions, given they were quoted companies. An obvious problem was the absence 
of buyers after the collapse of the boom in 1920. Moreover, given the evidence from the 
share registers, the presence of controlling cliques of directors was in itself sufficient to 
impose conditions of market illiquidity.  
This combination of low liquidity and significant individual holdings created a 
strong incentive for self-serving behaviour at the expense of the company and minority 
shareholders, that becomes stronger as control rights increase.77   One option would be 
to obtain rents through payment of dividends since any further re-capitalization and 
investment would shift future rents to minority investors. 
There were relatively few examples of family block holders within our sample, 
though the holding in Coppull Ring Mill by the Hollas family was one exception. The 
Hollas’s represented a significant textile interest and were effectively insider 
investors.78  Similarly, George, Robert, and Thomas Braddock, and Eric and John 
Brierley  jointly owned 17.6% and 12.7%, respectively of the stock in Avon Mill.79 
Variations on the importance of family blockholders include the Cheetham brothers, 
James and John, who were directors and jointly owned 25.3% of the stock in Anchor,80 
and the Mellor family (Samuel Firth, director) and his wife Annie (non-director), who 
jointly owned 32.7 % of Hartford Mill.81  
 A final and very important feature was the striking continuity between these 
investor groups in the Oldham section and the operations of similar groups, sometimes 
involving the same individuals, in the pre 1914 period. A feature of previous booms, for 
example in 1907, was the involvement of Bunting in the mill promotion boom (Toms, 
2002). Firth Mellor and Hammersley were also involved in putting together business 
groups through flotation and inter-locking directorships. 82  Another important 
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continuity was the involvement of successor generations. So James Henry Bunting 
continued his pre-war apprenticeship whilst successive generations of the architects 
and mill-designers A.H. Stott and Sons continued their practice of investing in the mills 
they helped to build.83 In short, the investors of the 1919-20 re-capitalisation boom were 
local, inter-connected, had intensive knowledge of the industry and were continuing 
well-established practice from before 1914. The connection to pre-war behaviour is 
important, insofar as the practices established then contributed to the subsequent failure 
of the industry.  
The governance characteristics identified by this review of corporate level 
characteristics strongly emphasize the importance of investor syndicates within the 
context of the industry. Building on this evidence, we argue that, controlling for debt, 
the firm’s strategy, financial performance, and long term survival will be determined by 
the governance characteristics of investor syndicates. More specifically, we suggest 
that large and recapitalized firms with outside share owners (as opposed to closely 
controlled, non-quoted firms) were less likely to exit. Recapitalised firms faced higher 
fixed costs arising from the change in ownership structure in the form of depreciation 
charges, dividends and interest charges. These costs are not fixed in the strict sense, for 
example dividends are highly discretionary, but they are sunk in the sense that they 
must be paid at some point if investors are to recover their committed capital. As noted 
above, these investors were often directors closely linked to promotional groups who 
were overcommitted to the industry on the basis of their investments and inter-locked 
board positions, thereby making it even more likely that recapitialisation would 
function as an exit barrier. Notwithstanding the influence of these and other directors, 
their control was not as complete as in a private firm and the availability of the option to 
sell implies that public firms would be more likely to exit. 
 22 
For firms that remained in the industry, although systemic industry conditions 
prevented turnarounds in general, some firms were more financiallly successful than 
others. Ceteris paribus because larger firms which had been recapitalised had potential 
access to greater financial resources, they were in a better position to dominate market 
niches or requip, where the directors chose to do so. However, such freedom of action 
would have been limited by pressure to pay dividends. Such pressures would have been 
higher where firms had recapitalised as investors holding such shares would require 
higher cash dividends to secure an equivalent return on their investments. To the extent 
that firms were leveraged through bank debt, it would be expected that, if Keynes was 
right, highly indebted firms would be less likely to exit. Empirical tests allow this 
argument to be tested against the contention that equity ownership was the driving force. 
In similar vein, as discussed above, banks had negligible involvement in 1920 but 
became closely involved subsequently and against their will as losses mounted, 
suggesting they had little knowldege of the industry and therefore were less likely to 
influence successful turnaround strategies. In restricting the free cash flow avaiallbe to 
managers, they might have also limited the tendency of firms to pay dividends in 
response to investor pressure. These arguments lead to following research hypotheses: 
1. Controlling for leverage, large, recapitalised, publicly quoted firms were less 
likely to exit the industry.  
2. Controlling for leverage, large, recapitalised, publicly quoted firms were more 
likely to be profitable.  
3. Controlling for leverage, large, recapitalised, publicly quoted firms were more 
likely to pay high dividends. 
The next section examines these complex relationships between corporate governance, 
strategy and performance using a statistical dataset. 
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Ownership characteristics and firm behaviour 
The previous section indicated that some companies in our sample were controlled by a 
network of extensive cross-directorships, often involving stock brokers.  Further, we 
also showed that directors of newly recapitalised firms were often substantial block 
holders. These findings facilitate the examination of the differential behaviour of firms 
within the industry in the 1920s and 1930s, with a particular focus on differences 
between governance arrangements, strategy and financial performance.  We employ a 
sample of 147 spinning firms to test the hypotheses outlined in previous section. 
The sample is based on the first year of extensively available accounting and 
share price data taken from Frederick  Tattersall’s Cotton Trade Review from 1926 et 
seq, using all firms with available data. These data were used to examine first the 
determinants of the decision to exit and second the determinants of financial 
performance.  
To examine the decision to exit, and the determinants of financial performance, 
data and financial information for the five-year period 1926-1931 was used in the 
following models: 
 
EXIT =   1+2RECAP  +  3PUBLIC+  4LEV+  5SIZE +     (1) 
 
APTC  =   1+2RECAP  +  3PUBLIC+  4LEV+  5SIZE +     (2) 
 
DIV  =   1+2RECAP  +  3PUBLIC+  4LEV+  5SIZE +     (3) 
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Model (1) has a discrete dependent variable, the decision to exit (EXIT), and is specified 
as a logit model. If a firm exits in the subsequent five years after 1926, EXIT is assigned 
a value of 1, and  0 otherwise. In model (2) the dependent variable is subsequent 
financial performance after 1926, defined as the ratio of accumulated profit/loss to total 
capital in 1931 (APTC). In general the higher this ratio the more successful the firm, 
and firms with positive ratios suffered no loss of capital in generally difficult trading 
circumstances and were able to pay dividends. The ratio is used as a proxy for 
turnaround success. In general, only firms with positive accumulated profits paid 
dividends, but because dividends also reduce the balance of accumulated profits, a third 
model was specified using the dividend rate (as a percentage of paid capital) as the 
dependent variable (DIV). Together these variables are proxies for relative success, at 
least from the financial perspective of the individual firm. Because the dividend 
variable is strongly left censored, model (3) is specified as a Tobit model. Model (2) is 
ordinary least squares. 
The explanatory variables are common to both models and each is described in 
turn. The RECAP variable captures the fixed costs arising from governance structures. 
If the firm had recapitalised in the 1920 boom, it typically resold its shares to syndicates 
of outside investors at three times the price of non-recapitalised firms. Firms were 
classified 1 or 0 according to whether they had recapitalised or not. Because investors 
had an incentive to force the firm to remain in the industry on the basis of expected 
future recovery of the committed investment, the expected sign on the RECAP  variable 
is negative. RECAP also potentially proxies for a second variable of interest, the 
presence of syndicate investor groups. To observe these effects separately, a further 
variable is required. The availability of active share price quotations was used to proxy 
for the presence of outside investors, including equity syndicates, as opposed to the 
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insider quasi partnership investors where no such trading opportunities existed. Quoted 
firms, with therefore approximately wider share ownership were labelled as PUBLIC 
and assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. As more closely controlled firms were under 
less pressure from outside investors to remain in the industry, and thus more likely to 
exit, the expected sign for the PUBLIC variable is positive.  
In addition to these categorical variables, two further continuous variables were 
included. First the ratio of debt to total capital, or leverage (LEV) and second, to control 
for size the total value of balance sheet assets of the firm are used (SIZE). The SIZE 
variable might also proxy for the power of incumbent managers, as a function of the 
value of the assets under their control. SIZE was transformed logarithmically to achieve 
closer proximity to normality, whereas LEV was not transformed due to a significant 
number of zero variables.  
As in many empirical governance studies, our data limitations do not allow 
research corporate governance as a process. As a result, we have to use governance 
proxies to describe the relationship between governance and organisational outcomes. 
In addition there are a number of specific caveats that should be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results. The first concerns preference shares, which might have 
impacted the relative voting power of large shareholders.  Table 1 shows that of the 41 
firms analysed in detail, few used preference shares. Of the 147 firms in the larger 
sample, only nine issued preference shares.84  In all cases, these were issued prior to the 
1919-1920 recapitalisation boom. 85   A further point is that it would have been 
interesting to specify a variable to test the effects of inside and outside ownership 
blocks. Unfortunately, the number of shareholder registers allowing the precise 
identification of this split was judged too small to allow tests of statistical significance. 
For this reason, some caution needs to be exercised in the interpretation of our RECAP 
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variable. A final observation is that it the age of firms might have had a bearing on our 
results.  Thus, ceterus paribus, newer mills might be expected to be more profitable 
than older mills because of, for example, scale based advantages and the employment 
of modern technology. We included an age variable in our regressions but the results 
we report below did not change significantly.86   
The results are presented in Tables 3-6. Tables 3 and 4 show descriptive 
statistics. Table 5 shows the classification of the 147 firms according to their strategy: 
turnaround success (APTC>0), turnaround failures (APTC<0) and exits. Table 6 shows 
the results for models (1), (2) and (3) above.  
 
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 about here 
Table 5 about here 
Table 6 about here 
 
The RECAP variable is negative and strongly significant in model (1), showing 
that the presence of governance related fixed or sunk costs constitute an exit barrier. 
Table 5 confirms that relatively few recapitalised firms exited the industry. Where 
firms remained in the industry RECAP  was associated with turnaround success, 
evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients in models (2) and (3). The 
PUBLIC variable is also negative in model (1) and significant, supporting the 
hypothesis that outside investor groups prevented exit. The data in Table 5 also show 
that a very high proportion (50/58, or 86%) of successful turnarounds were public 
companies. Although the PUBLIC variable is insignificant in model (2) it is positive 
and highly significant in model (3). Public ownership, albeit by the syndicates, is 
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therefore associated with firms staying in the industry and with turnaround success but 
this is manifested in the form of high dividend payments and not the accumulation of 
profits. In other words, syndicate investment acted as an exit barrier, helped stabilise 
cash flows, but undermined subsequent stages of the turnaround associated with new 
investment and repositioning.  
Exit was positively but weakly related to high borrowing in model (1). Exiting 
firms had higher leverage than turnaround firms (Table 5), but the difference was 
marginal compared to firms unsuccessfully attempting turnarounds. In models (2) and 
(3) leverage was negatively and significantly related to turnaround success. In other 
words lenders exerted weak pressure on firms to exit and acted as a constraint for the 
firms that stayed in the industry and attempted turnarounds. Firms with relatively high 
debt were less likely to pay dividends. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis 
suggests that opportunistic managers may try to appropriate FCF at expense of minority 
shareholders, and presence of fixed-claim holders may restrain this opportunism. There 
is some evidence from the data in Table 1 that debt holders did indeed constrain 
directors. The banks therefore did what they were supposed to do under the FCF 
hypothesis, even though for Keynes this wasn’t enough.  
Finally SIZE had a significant and negative impact on exit and was positive and 
strongly significantly associated with turnaround success. Insofar as SIZE proxies for 
managerial power, the impact is the same direction as PUBLIC, supporting the view 
from the archival evidence that managerial groups were able to combine long run 
investment strategy with good knowledge of the industry. However, the speculation 
that enabled them to build business empires and appropriate associated rents in the 
pre-war period went badly wrong after 1920. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
Recapitalisation was not new in the Lancashire textile industry or, indeed, in other 
British industries.  Macrosty, for example, demonstrated that large sections of British 
manufacturing, brewing, chemicals, iron and steel, and textiles, participated in similar 
schemes, often with subsequent dire financial performance during the early twentieth 
century.87  However, the new and unique features of the boom in the Lancashire textile 
industry during the inter-wars were the scale of recapitalisation, the method of its 
financing, and the often disastrous involvement of external financial syndicates. 
Consequently, industrial reorganisation was totally untenable without government 
intervention.  
 Indeed, by the late 1920s, the Bank of England was increasingly concerned 
about the exposure of particular banks to the cotton spinning industry. According to 
Sayers, the Governor, Montague Norman, would ‘have known that two if not three of 
the smaller banks, and at last two of the Big Five, were so deeply involved in 
Lancashire’s financial mire that further deterioration and eventual exposure might have 
rocked the whole banking system’.88  Attempts to improve the financial health of 
exposed banks via amalgamation met with only limited success. Consequently, direct 
intervention in the spinning industry by the Bank of England was necessary.  In 1929, 
via the Bankers Industrial Development Corporation, the Bank of England, financed 
the formation of the LCC.  Between 1929 and 1931, the Bank advanced £920,000 to the 
LCC which it used to acquire approximately 10m spindles and 100 firms, respectively,  
in the heavily depressed ‘American’ section.  This amalgamation facilitated 
rationalisation of the industry and, by encouraging  encouraged the formation of other 
combines, helped to eradicate ruinous price cutting.89 
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 Keynes’s assertion that capacity mattered is true and no one would dispute the 
problems caused by over-capacity and weak selling. However, we dispute the assertion 
that capacity was all that mattered and that capitalisation was unimportant. Indeed, 
following from the above analysis the reverse was true:  capitalisation was a serious 
barrier to exit for some firms and to reorganisation by others. It was more significant 
than bank debt, even though as has been demonstrated, bank debt performed its correct 
function of disciplining managers and associated insider groups. Over-capitalisation 
was serious without bank debt and would have become serious even without 
over-capacity, committing Lancashire firms to high fixed capital costs as overseas 
competitors entered export markets. 
  Changing capital structures, thereby undoing the mistakes of 1919-20, was 
therefore essential for the recovery of the industry. Even in the relatively weak legal 
framework of the 1920s, however, radical variation of ownership rights (writing-off the 
capital of a whole industry) was non-trivial. Not surprisingly perhaps, the only 
contemporaries calling for this solution were the speculators themselves, and they were 
unlikely to be received sympathetically by economists, policy makers or anyone else. 
The real irony is that, like Keynes, they recognised, through their own mistakes, the 
need for an end to laissez-faire. 
 This article has demonstrated that it is not possible to develop simple 
generalisations about the role of financial syndicates during the interwar years.  Earlier 
scholarship revealed that many of the features of the Lancashire recapitalisation boom 
after 1919 were common to this and other industries, bicycles, brewing, and motor cars 
prior to 1914. An example was the practice of ‘watering’ (capitalising a company well 
above its asset value) and recycling the receipts from the purchase of a company to the 
previous shareholders.90 However, in Lancashire, the involvement of external and local 
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syndicates had undesirable results, though their financial environment was very 
different. External syndicates, for example White and Edgar, proved disastrous for 
ACMT and C&WCM, whose shares were quoted on the highly liquid London and 
Manchester stock exchanges. In contrast, local syndicates buying shares in Oldham 
companies, became highly entrenched and prevented exit for the same reason the banks 
promoted weak selling – their inability to realise the value of their original investments 
through the highly illiquid Oldham exchange.  
 This case study suggests that a much broader business history enquiry is 
justified into the interactions between financial syndicates and business in general, 
which will help develop the ‘circle of knowledge creation’.91 For example, accounting 
analysis can demonstrate the precise impact of promoters and syndicates on particular 
companies: how big were the initial gains (and subsequent losses) in assets and share 
prices compared to a comparator group?  How quickly did companies recover, and what 
factors were instrumental in this?  Analysis of share registers can reveal the degree of 
‘stagging’,  which provides some indication of the severity of asymmetric information 
between promoters (vendors) and shareholders.  Econometric analysis of share price 
data can reveal the illiquidity of stock markets and the range of survival strategies 
available to firms.   
 Finally, our findings have particular relevance to the development of theory and 
its application to industries in acute financial distress. The prior literature showcases 
the role of block-holders in promoting corporate restructuring, but this research 
suggests that liquid stock markets and/or exogenous solutions to the problem of sunk 
investment and embedded ownership rights are also important necessary conditions. 
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Table 1 Recapitalisation, blockholdings and financial characteristics of 
sample re-floated companies. 
 
Company Date of  
Return1 
Total paid up  
share capital (£) 
% shares  
owned 
by directors 
% shares owned  
by blockholders2 
Loan capital (£) 
1.Ace Mill Ltd.     14 April, 1921 240,000 37.7 No sig blocks Mortgage: 150,000 
2.Anchor Sp. Co. Ltd. 24 January, 1921 37,500 74.6 No sig. blocks Loans: 146,635 
3.Argyll Cotton Sp. Co. Ltd. 28 April, 1921 150,000 15.3 No sig. blocks Loans: 149,320 
4.Arrow Mill Ltd. 26 June, 1920 150,000 n.a. 6.7 Bank o/d: 45,000 
Loans: 188,000 
5.Asia Mill Ltd. 19 January, 1921 160,000 17.9 25 Loans: 72,562 
6.Astley Mills Co Ltd. 25 March, 1920 300,000 11.8 No sig. blocks Bank o/d: 104,000 
Loans: 201,000 
7.Athens Mill Co Ltd. 8 March, 1920 120,000 19.1 No sig. blocks No debt 
8.Atherton Mills Ltd. 27 October, 1920 250,000 2.4 7.6 Loans: 299,000 
9.Avon Sp. Co Ltd. 11 February, 1920 150,000 27.3 38.3 Loans: 26,000 
10.Belgian Mills Co. 4 August, 1920 70,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
11.Belgrave Mills Co Ltd. 20 October, 1920 20,000 38.6 27.5 No debt 
12.Bolton Union 
Spinning Co Ltd. 
14 March, 1921 86,000 39.0 53.5 n.a. 
13.Briar Mill Ltd. 31 May, 1920 100,000 30.3 No sig. blocks Bank o/d: 80,253 
Loans: 294,497 
14.Broadway Sp. Co Ltd. 25 May, 1920 90,000 34.1 No sig. blocks No debt 
15.Brunswick Mill Ltd. 30 January, 1920 120,000 6.2 No sig. blocks Loans: 50,000 
16.Butts Mills Ltd. 9 June, 1921 375,000 15.4 7.5 Bank o/d: 114,000 
Debentures: 19,000 
Loans: 257,000 
Mortgage: 26,000 
 
17.Cairo Mill Co Ltd. 25 April, 1921 175,000 n.a. No sig. blocks No debt 
18.Cavendish Sp. Co Ltd. 26 March 1920 176,920 7.7 No sig. blocks n.a. 
19.Century Ring Mill Ltd. 5 August, 1920 130,000 66.5 No sig. blocks Loans: 132,000 
20.Clover Mill Co Ltd. 27 February, 1920 240,000 35.7 No sig. blocks n.a. 
 
21.Commercial Mill Sp. Co Ltd 17 January, 1920 75,000 9.7 No sig. blocks Loans: 55,000 
22.Coppull Ring Sp Co. 10 June, 1920 225,000 37.9 43.7 Loans: 59,000 
23.Coral Mills Ltd. 30 December, 1919 150,000 0.0 6.1 Loans: 18,000 
Mortgage: 60,000 
24.Dawn Mill Co Ltd. 29 April, 1920 100,000 17.3 No sig. blocks No debt 
25.Delta Mill Co Ltd. 18 August 1920 150,000 28.3 No sig. blocks Loans: 166,000 
Overdraft: 169,000 
26.Duchess Sp. Co Ltd. 24 March, 1920 60,000 36.2 No sig. blocks Loans: 71,368 
27.Earl Mill Co Ltd. 26 January, 1921 90,000 28.0 No sig. blocks No debt 
28.Elder Mill Ltd. 14 May, 1920 61,125 12.3 49.9  
29.Falcon Mill Co. Ltd. 24 September, 1920 190,000 10.9 No sig. blocks Loans: 142,000 
30.Fern Cotton Sp. Co. Ltd. 2 March, 1921 125,000 12.4 15.6 No debt 
31.Fernhurst Sp.Co. Ltd. 19 December, 1919 260,000 92.0 No sig. blocks Loans: 148,500 
32.Glodwick Cotton Sp. Co 
Ltd. 
12 March, 1920 100,000 15.0 No sig. blocks Loans: 119,000 
33.Gorse Mill Ltd. 31 December, 1920 75,000 n.a. No sig. blocks No debt 
34.Greenacres Cotton Sp.  
Co. Ltd. 
28 December 1919 125,000 14.4 No sig. blocks Loans: 152,000 
35.Hartford Mill Ltd. 21 October, 1920 130,000 31.0 8.7 No debt 
36.Magnet Mill Ltd. 29 December, 1921 76,630 0.0  No sig. blocks Loans: 109,000 
Pref. shares: 37,000 
37.Park Mill (Royton). 11 February, 1920 36,000 11.2 No sig. blocks No debt 
38.Ruby Mill Co Ltd. 19 May, 1920 31,552 0.0 No sig. blocks Loan. Deposit a/c: 
27,000 
39.Rutland Mill Ltd. 25 June, 1918 48,000 1.9 No sig. blocks Loans: 153,000 
40.Textile Mill Co Ltd. 5 December, 1919 8,000 80.4 6.25 Loans and interest: 
185,000 
41.Times Mill Co. Ltd 29 April, 1919 32,000 65.7 16.9 Loans: 234,000 
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Notes: 
1 Refers to the date the source documents were filed at Companies House 
2 Significant block-holders are those who individually own 5% or greater of paid up share 
capital. 
3 N.a. means not available. 
 
 
Sources: Ace, TNA, BT 31/32360/162516; Anchor, TNA, BT 31/32438/168982; Argyll, 
TNA, BT 31/36914/165226; Arrow, TNA, BT 31/32335/160744; Asia, TNA, BT 
31/37696/16711; Astley, TNA, BT 31/32339/165099; Athens, TNA, BT 31/32335/160787; 
Atherton, TNA, BT 31/37693/162145;  Avon, TNA, BT 31/38811/159919; Belgian, TNA, 
BT 31/32371/163568;  Belgrave, TNA, BT 31/25035/158943; Bolton Union, TNA, BT 
31/32419/166839; Briar, TNA, BT 31/36670/163570; Broadway, TNA, BT 
31/32354/162152; Brunswick, TNA, BT 31/32378/163957; Butts, TNA, BT 
31/38834-36/167722; Cairo, TNA, BT 31/39365/163619; Cavendish, TNA, BT 
31/33811/165932;  Century, TNA, BT 31/32338/161017; Clover, TNA, BT 
31/36912/164330; Commercial, TNA, BT 31/37691/160540;  Coppull, TNA, BT 
31/35255/168122;  Coral, TNA, BT 31/37277/161019; Dawn, TNA, BT 31/36384/161805; 
Delta, TNA, BT 31/36385/161972; Duchess, TNA, BT 31/32362/162803; Earl, TNA, BT 
31/32361/162607;  Elder, TNA, BT 31/32392/164696; Falcon, TNA, BT 31/40637/164621;  
Fern, TNA, BT 31/32371/163516; Fernhurst, TNA, BT 31/36910/159530;  Glodwick, TNA, 
BT 31/32351/161817; Gorse, TNA, BT 31/32349/161673; Greenacres, TNA, BT 
31/32346/161415;  Hartford, TNA, BT 31/32314/158753;  Magnet, TNA, BT 
31/31856/72977; Park Mill, TNA, BT 31/36258/81607;  Ruby, TNA, BT 31/31158/28738;  
Rutland, TNA, BT 31/31959/91732; Textile, TNA, BT 31/32270/153035; Times, TNA, BT 
31/31617/57373.  
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Table 2. Interlocking directorships within our sample of re-capitalised Lancashire 
spinning firms, 1919-1921.1 
 
Name of Director Spinning Company directorships held 
Edward Heaton 
Blackburn 
Argyll Cotton Spinning Co Ltd; Mona Mill Ltd; Peel Mills Co. Ltd; 
Raven Mill Ltd; Sun Mill Co. Ltd.; Slack Mills Ltd. 
Herbert Bleakley Arkwright Cotton Spinning Co Ltd; Arrow Mill Ltd; Century Ring 
Mill Ltd; Dale Mills Co Ltd. 
George Cottam Argyll Cotton Spinning Co. Ltd; Hartford Mill Ltd; Mersey Mill Ltd; 
Atlas Mills Ltd.  
Fred Dawson Cavendish Spinning Company Ltd; Rayners Ltd; Minerva Spinning 
Co Ltd; Astley Mills Co. Ltd; F.L. Bentley Ltd; Oldham Athletic 
Assoc. Football Club Ltd; Oldham Twist Co. Ltd; Hope Mill Co. Ltd; 
Chadderton Mill Co. Ltd;  Copster Mill Co. Ltd; Melbourne Mill Co. 
Ltd; Malta Mill Co. Ltd; Ram Mill Co. Ltd; Bury Paper Tube Co. 
Ltd; Robert Stott Ltd; Robert Thatcher & Co. Ltd. 
Joseph Deveney Arrow Mills Ltd; Century Ring Mill Ltd; Slack Mills Ltd; Victoria 
Mill Ltd.; Wellfield Mill Ltd. 
Thomas Howe Cavendish Spinning Company Ltd; Rayners Ltd; Minerva Spinning 
Co Ltd; Astley Mills Co. Ltd; F.L. Bentley Ltd;; Oldham Twist Co. 
Ltd; Hope Mill Co. Ltd; Chadderton Mill Co. Ltd;  Copster Mill Co. 
Ltd; Melbourne Mill Co. Ltd; Malta Mill Co. Ltd; Ram Mill Co. Ltd; 
Robert Stott Ltd; Robert Thatcher & Co. Ltd. 
Samuel Firth Mellor* Argyll Mill Ltd.; Broadway Spinning Co Ltd.; Fernhurst Spinning 
Co Ltd; Gee Cross Mills Ltd; Gorse Mill Ltd; Greenacres Cotton 
Spinning Co Ltd ; Guide Bridge Spinning Co. Ltd; Hartford Mill Ltd; 
Marsland Mills Ltd; Mars Mill ltd;; Mersey Mill Ltd ; Monton Mill 
Ltd; Orb Mill Co Ltd; Peel Mills co Ltd; Princess Mill Co. Ltd; 
Rugby Mill Ltd ; Stockport Ring Mill. 
Herbert Mills Cavendish Spinning Company Ltd; Rayners Ltd; Minerva Spinning 
Co Ltd; Astley Mills Co. Ltd; F.L. Bentley Ltd; Oldham Athletic 
Assoc. Football Club Ltd. 
William Noton Fern Cotton Spinning Co Ltd; Delta Mill Co. Ltd. 
Frederick Simm  Arrow Mill Ltd ; Century Ring Mill Ltd; Era Mill Ltd. 
George Stott Anchor Spinning Co. Ltd; Avon Spinning Co Ltd; Fern Cotton 
Spinning Co Ltd; Soudan Mills Co. Ltd; Kent Mill Ltd; Ace Mill Ltd. 
Harry Tweedale* Arrow; Dale  
James Waller Arrow; Dale; Union Ring Mill 
Bertram Whitehead Cavendish Spinning Company Ltd; Minerva Spinning Co Ltd; Astley 
Mills Co. Ltd 
Edward Whitehead Avon; Delta Mill Co Ltd; Devon Mill Ltd; Gresham Mill Co Ltd; 
Osborne Mill Co Ltd. 
Edwin Wilson Argyll Cotton Spinning Co Ltd; Equitable Spinning Co Ltd; 
Monarch Mill Co. Ltd.  
Alexander Young Athens Mill Co Ltd; Bolton Union Spinning Co Ltd.; Brunswick Mill 
Ltd; Butts Mills Ltd; Falcon Mill Co Ltd.; Trencherfield Mills Co. 
Ltd. 
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Notes:  
1. Refers to directorships held by directors of spinning companies that 
 recapitalised between 1919-1921. 
 
 * Samuel Firth Mellor and Harry Tweedale were stockbrokers. 
 
Sources: Directorships of all directors are referenced in the following TNA files:  
Edward Heaton Blackburn, The Swan Mill, TNA, BT 31/40621/159990; Herbert 
Bleakley, Arrow, TNA, BT 31/32335/160744; Joseph Deveney, Arrow, TNA, BT 
31/32335/160744; Samuel Firth Mellor, George Cottam and Edwin Wilson,  Argyll, 
TNA, BT 31/36914/165226; William Noton, Delta, TNA BT 31/36385/161972; Fern, 
TNA BT 31/ 32371/163516;  Frederick Simm, Arrow, TNA, BT 31/32335/160744; 
George Stott, Avon, TNA, BT 31/ 38811/159919; Harry Tweedale, Arrow, TNA, BT 
31/32335/160744; Alexander Young, Bolton Union, TNA, BT 31/32419/166839; 
James Waller, Arrow, TNA, BT 31/32335/160744; Edward Whitehead, Avon, TNA, BT 
31/38811/159919; Alexander Young, Bolton Union, TNA, BT 31/32419/166839; 
Herbert Mills, Fred Dawson, Thomas Howe, Bertram Whitehead, Cavendish, TNA, BT 
31/33811/165932. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
  Min  Max  Mean   S.dev  
 
 
Continuous variables: 
APTC   -6.696  2.079  -0.272  0.825*** 
DIV    0.000  25.000  3.630  5.580*** 
LEV   0.000  1.903  0.368  0.338*** 
SIZE   8.144  13.473  11.567  0.877** 
 
Grouping variables: 
EXIT       0.224 
RECAP      0.476 
PUBLIC      0.776 
 
 
S-Wilk p-value: 
*** p < .01 
** p <  .05 
 
Data definitions: 
APTC: Accumulated profit to capital ratio, 1926-1931.    
DIV: Dividend as a percentage of paid up capital.     
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
EXIT: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm exits, = 0 otherwise 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 4. Correlation matrix (independent variables) 
 
 
 
RECAP PUBLIC   LEV  SIZE 
    
 
RECAP     1.000  
PUBLIC     -0.172**   1.000  
LEV       0.098   -0.0230 1.000  -0.059 
SIZE     -0.347***   0.165**   1.000 
 
 
Spearman’s Rho (below diagonal)/Pearson’s co-efficient (above diagonal) significance 
levels 
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
 
 
Data definitions: 
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for strategic outcomes 
 
 
 
STRATEGY  VARIABLE 
 
 
  APTC DIV RECAP PUBLIC LEV SIZE 
 N  % N N  £ 
Turnaround        
- Success 58 0.152 8.780  37 50 0.289 172,671 
- Fail 56 -0.282 0.435 20 43 0.408 141,392 
Exits 33 -0.999 0.000 13 21 0.436 112,631 
 
 
Data definitions: 
APTC: Accumulated profit to capital ratio, 1926-1931.    
DIV: Dividend as a percentage of paid up capital.     
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 6. Regression models 
 
 
Model     (1)  (2)  (3) 
    Logit  OLS  Tobit 
 
Dependent variable  EXIT  APTC  DIV 
 
Independent variables: 
CONST   11.386*** -4.083** -62.168*** 
0.001  0.036  0.000 
RECAP   -1.406*** 0.444** 13.293*** 
    0.002  0.013  0.000 
PUBLIC   -0.955** -0.072  6.936*** 
0.042  0.612  0.005 
LEV    0.843  -0.589** -11.397*** 
    0.155  0.014  0.000 
SIZE    -1.019*** 0.334** 4.504*** 
0.001  0.037  0.000 
 
R-square1   0.151  0.184  0.114 
Prob2         0.000  0.000  0.000 
Residual S-Wilk  N/A  0.000  N/A 
 
 
Co-efficients are reported for each independent variable with respective p-values 
underneath. N = 147 for all models. In model (3) 95 observations are left-censored at 0. 
In models (1) and (2) p-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimation matrix. All models were re-tested with serial deletion of 
inter-correlated variables and insertion of interaction variables. The results were robust 
to alternative specifications. Model (2) was re-tested using a non-parametric 
formulation (quantile regression). Model co-efficients signs remained unchanged and 
significance levels increased marginally for significant co-efficients in the OLS model. 
 
1 Psuedo in models (1) and (3), adjusted in model (2) 
2 >Chi in models (1) and (3), and > F in model (2) 
 
Two-tailed significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05 
 
 
Data definitions: 
APTC: Accumulated profit to capital ratio, 1926-1931.    
DIV: Dividend as a percentage of paid up capital.     
LEV: Ratio of debt to total capital.   
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 
EXIT: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm exits, = 0 otherwise 
RECAP: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm recapitalised, = 0 otherwise   
PUBLIC: Dummy variable = 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted, = 0 otherwise 
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